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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the problems for judicial impartiality that a judge’s extrajudicial 
speaking or writing on academic matters may create. Examples from New Zealand and 
abroad demonstrate such extrajudicial commentary may lead to a finding of apparent 
bias or require that a judge recuse himself from hearing a case. The current regulation 
of extrajudicial speech, as ascertained from judicial conduct codes and case law, 
provides that judges can speak and write extrajudicially on such matters but must 
exercise caution in the tone and language they use. The paper concludes that this is an 
appropriate approach and that a solution of judicial silence is undesirable. This 
conclusion is supported by empirical research conducted by the author which shows 
that the incidence of extrajudicial writing in New Zealand is low. 
 
Word Length 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) comprises approximately 14,987 words. 
 
Subjects and Topics 
 
Extrajudicial Speech, or 
Extrajudicial Writing, 
Judicial Bias and Recusal, or 
Judicial Impartiality, or 
Hoekstra v H.M. Advocate (No 3), or 
Timmins v Gormley. 
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I Introduction 
 
In 2012, when Judge David Harvey was poised to speak at the NetHui conference on 
internet law months before he was due to hear Kim Dotcom’s extradition hearing, no 
one expressed concern. This is largely because the practice of judges writing or 
speaking extrajudicially is common in New Zealand and seen as largely innocuous. 
However, when, in the course of his speech, Judge Harvey joked that the United States 
was the “enemy”, it lead to a media furore. In those circumstances, the Judge chose to 
recuse himself from hearing the case. This example demonstrates that extrajudicial 
writing, as benign as it might appear, can have serious consequences. Specifically, 
extrajudicial writing may be the basis of a determination a judge is biased or may 
necessitate his recusal.1 The purpose of this paper is to explore this problem. 
 
As background to the issue, Part II discusses the concept of judicial impartiality and 
why it is demanded. It also explains the law relating to judicial bias and recusal. Part 
III then examines the specific bias and recusal issues extrajudicial speech creates. This 
includes a discussion of the empirical research conducted by the author, on the extent 
of judicial publication in New Zealand law reviews.2 In addition, the Part will provide 
further detail on the incident involving Judge Harvey as well as examples from 
England, Scotland and the United States. Next, Part IV explains how extrajudicial 
speech is regulated, as identified in judicial conduct codes and case law. Broadly, the 
current position is that extrajudicial speech is permissible, but judges must consider the 
tone and language they employ. If a judge is too immoderate in his writing or speaking, 
this may lead to a finding of apparent bias or require recusal.  
 
Having ascertained the current rules surrounding extrajudicial speech, the remainder of 
the paper is dedicated to determining whether this approach is favourable. Part V 
explores the policy goals that underpin any approach to extrajudicial speech: protecting 
judicial free speech and ensuring the judicial system functions effectively and 
efficiently. With these competing interests in mind, Part V discusses whether the status 
quo achieves an appropriate balance. A reform option of judicial silence, proposed by 
Australian academics, Bartie and Gava, is considered in Part VI. 
 
The conclusion reached is that the current regulation of extrajudicial speech, which 
focuses on the particular tone and language a judge has used, is correct. This approach 
provides for a judge’s right to freedom of expression, while also ensuring that the 
functioning of the legal system is unharmed. As such, there is no imperative for reform. 
                                               
1 For the purposes of this paper, the use of the terms “he” and “his” should be read as “he or she” and 
“his or her”. 
2 The findings of this research are summarised in the Appendices to the paper.  
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Bartie and Gava’s suggestion of judicial silence is rejected on this basis, and also 
because it would produce undesirable results. As a critique, Part VII concludes by 
considering a legal realist perspective, which interprets extrajudicial speech in a very 
different manner.  
 
II Judicial Impartiality 
 
The judicial system is founded on the values of independence and impartiality. 
Hammond J characterised the “adjudication of legal disputes by impartial and 
independent judges” as “an essential underpinning of western society”.3 Judicial 
independence is the notion that the judiciary is not beholden to the executive and 
legislature, and that judges are independent from their colleagues.4 The New Zealand 
Guidelines on Judicial Conduct (Guidelines) describes judicial independence as a 
“means to the end of impartiality”.5 Judicial impartiality relates to rights of natural 
justice, specifically the well-known Latin maxims of nemo iudex in causa sua and audi 
alteram partem.6 This paper concentrates on judicial impartiality and argues it may be 
called into question by a judge’s extrajudicial writing. As such, this Part explores the 
concept of judicial impartiality and its importance. 
A What is Impartiality? 
 
Elias CJ has extrajudicially described impartiality as the “essential” attribute of a 
judge.7 Likewise Ipp8 posits that the judiciary is “conditioned to believe that to act other 
than impartially is essentially evil and inimical to” their “code of conduct”.9 To act 
impartially requires that the judge’s sole motivation in judging is to “do right according 
to the law to the parties.”10 Judicial impartiality is enshrined in judicial oath to “do right 
to all manner of people after the laws and usages of New Zealand without fear or favour, 
                                               
3 Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2007] NZCA 334, [2007] 3 NZLR 495 at [31]. 
4 Shimon Shetreet “Judicial independence and accountability: core values in liberal democracies” in HP 
Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 3 at 3.  
5 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct” (March 2013) Courts of New Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz> at 
[27]. 
6 Translation: “no one be a judge in their own case” and “one must listen to both sides”. See Brian 
Flanagan “Scalia, Hamdan and the Principles of Subject Matter Recusal” (2007) 19 Denning L J 149 at 
149. 
7 Sian Elias “Singapore Academy of Law Annual Lecture 2004: Impartiality in Judging and the Passions 
of Mankind” [2005] S Ac LJ at [1]. 
8 Judge of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
9 David Ipp “Maintaining the Tradition of Judicial Impartiality” (2009) 9 TJR 253 at 255. 
10 Elias, above n 7, at [2]. 
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affection or ill will”.11 Restating this in contemporary language, Lord Bingham has 
noted the oath requires:12 
 
That a judge must free himself of prejudice and partiality and so conduct himself, 
in court and out of it, as to give no ground for doubting his ability and willingness 
to decide cases coming before him solely on their legal and factual merits as they 
appear to him in the exercise of an objective, independent and impartial judgment. 
 
The right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial judge is a 
right protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.13 Beyond this, it is 
recognised a judge’s impartiality must exist in fact and by reasonable appearance.14 In 
the words of Lord Hewart’s famous maxim, “justice must not only be done, but should 
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”15 
B Why is Impartiality Required? 
 
In addition to being required to give effect to fair trial rights, impartiality is essential to 
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary. This is conducive to the public accepting 
the judiciary’s legitimacy. Impartiality is the precondition upon which the public adhere 
to the authority of judges “who are not elected and not directly responsible to the elected 
branches of government.”16 Blanchard J explains that “unless the judicial system is seen 
as independent and impartial the public will not have confidence in it and the judiciary 
who serve in it.”17 If the public were not confident in the judiciary, people would not 
adhere to court orders, rendering their enforcement impossible.18 This would lead to a 
system where disputes are not settled peacefully by the courts, but by people “tak[ing] 
the law into their own hands.”19 
 
The link between judicial impartiality and public confidence was precisely stated by 
Lord Denning MR, who stated “justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is 
destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘the judge was biased.’”20 
                                               
11 Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s 18. 
12 Lord Bingham The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000) at 74. 
13 S 25(a). 
14 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [21]. 
15 R v Sussex Justices; ex parte McCarthy [1924] KC 256 at 259. 
16 Elias, above n 7, at [2]. 
17 Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 at [3]. 
18 Anthony Mason “The courts and public opinion” in Geoffrey Lindell (ed) The Mason Papers: Selected 
articles and speeches by Sir Anthony Mason (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2007) 94 at 95. 
19 Mason “The courts and public opinion”, above n 18, at 95.  
20 Metropolitan Properties Co (Ltd) v Lannon [1969] 1 QB 577 at 598. 
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Therefore, impartiality is required as a matter of fact and appearance – the mere 
appearance of bias, whether it actually exists or not, is damaging to public confidence. 
On this point, the Guidelines note that the “reasonable appearance of partiality can be 
impossible to dispel, leaving a sense of injustice which is deeply destructive of 
confidence in judicial decisions.”21 As such, a judge should ensure the appearance of 
bias does not arise by a conflict of interest, his behaviour in court and his activities off 
the bench.22 Judges should also be mindful of “expressions of views which might give 
the appearance of bias”, whether that be in or out of court.23  
C The Law Relating to Bias 
 
The law on bias and recusal protects judicial impartiality and safeguards public 
confidence in the judiciary. 
1 Bias 
 
There are three categories of bias. First, a judge may be actually biased, that is, partial 
or prejudiced in some way. Actual bias is difficult to prove, requiring “direct evidence 
or a very strong inference that the judge was so predisposed against a party that he… 
had an entirely closed mind”.24 It is accepted cases of actual bias will seldom occur. 
Second, a judge may be automatically disqualified from hearing a case because he has 
a pecuniary interest in the result or because the decision will promote a cause the judge 
is involved in.25 The third category of bias is apparent bias. This differs from actual bias 
because the bias the judge is subject to is unconscious, rather than being a conscious 
bias.26 
 
The formulation of the test for apparent bias has varied over the years,27 however 
following the decision of the Supreme Court in Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board 
                                               
21 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [23]. 
22 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [23]. 
23 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [23]. 
24 Grant Hammond Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Hart Publishing, Portland, 
2009) at 17.  
25 See generally Dimes v Grant Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759 and R v Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate and Ors, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2001] 1 AC 110 (HL). It is unclear 
whether or not the rule of automatic disqualification continues to apply in New Zealand. Tipping J in 
Saxmere recommended the Australian approach, which subsumes automatic disqualification into 
apparent bias, be followed, see Saxmere, above n 17, at [42]. 
26 Saxmere, above n 17, at [41]. 
27 See generally Gerald McCoy “Judicial Recusal in New Zealand” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 322 at 324. 
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Disestablishment Co Ltd, its precise wording is settled in New Zealand. Apparent bias 
will be established if:28 
 
A fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend the judge might not bring 
an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. 
 
The test focuses on the objective appearance of bias to the fair-minded lay observer. If 
that lay observer perceives a judge might not have been impartial, public confidence in 
the justice system would be undermined. Thus, in combination with actual bias, the law 
ensures that justice is done and seen to be done.   
 
In order to decide if the apparent bias test is satisfied, it is important to understand who 
the fair-minded lay observer is. It is clear the fair-minded lay observer is not the 
particular litigant to a dispute.29  That litigant obviously has their own motivations for 
challenging the impartiality of the judge, most likely to have a prior decision 
overturned, and thus is “the least objective observer of all”.30  Instead, the fair-minded 
lay observer “views matters objectively”.31 They are “presumed to be intelligent” and 
are “neither unduly sensitive or suspicious nor complacent about what may influence 
the judge’s decision”.32 While the fair-minded lay observer is a not a lawyer, they know 
of the facts and issues of the relevant case and understand the workings of the legal 
system.33 In particular, a fair-minded lay observer is taken to know that a judge is 
required to be independent and has taken an oath to this effect.34  
2 Recusal 
 
According to the Guidelines “judges have an obligation to sit on any case allocated 
unless grounds for disqualification exist.”35 This is referred to as the duty to sit and 
balances against judicial impartiality. The duty to sit ensures judges do not recuse too 
easily, at the mere suggestion of bias by a litigant.36 This duty exists in relation to a 
number of different concerns. The first acknowledges that challenging a judge’s 
                                               
28 Saxmere, above n 17, at [3]. 
29 Saxmere, above n 17, at [6]. 
30 Saxmere, above n 17, at [10]. 
31 Saxmere, above n 17, at [5]. 
32 Saxmere, above n 17, at [5]. See also Helow v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Another 
(Scotland) [2008] UKHL 6 at [1]–[3]. 
33 Saxmere, above n 17, at [5]. See also Taylor v Lawrence (Appeal: Jurisdiction to Reopen) [2003] QB 
528 at [60]. 
34 Saxmere, above n 17, at [8]. 
35 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [27]. 
36 McCoy, above n 27, at 327. 
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impartiality is something litigants often do as a “last-ditch remedy” because they have 
been unsuccessful in a case.37 Elias CJ, extrajudicially, has noted there is “no shortage” 
of this behaviour in New Zealand.38 Second, recusing too easily creates a perverse 
policy incentive for litigants, to “raise objections which are based solely on their desire 
to have their case determined by a different judge who they think is more likely to 
decide in their favour”.39 Last, the duty to sit also reflects the burden that frequent 
recusals would place on other judges and the legal system more generally.40 This burden 
includes judges being overworked and time delays in cases being heard. 
 
A judge should recuse himself from hearing a case where the apparent bias test from 
Saxmere is satisfied.41 It is accepted this is a question for the judge to decide,42 although 
a party to the litigation can suggest to the judge matters that may necessitate recusal.43 
The Guidelines recommend it is best practice for judges to be prudent if they are unsure 
as to whether their recusal is required.44 Hammond colloquially describes the practice 
as “if in doubt, out.”45 The rationale for prudence is that a later determination that the 
judge should have recused himself, requires the case to be heard again, placing a greater 
burden on the legal system, in terms of both time and expense 
 
III Extrajudicial Speech: Canvassing the Problem 
 
The importance of judicial impartiality and the law on bias and recusal sets the scene 
for this paper. It is in relation to these ideas that extrajudicial speech creates concern. 
This Part will identify the different types of extrajudicial speech and discuss the 
problems they cause. 
A The Different Types of Extrajudicial Speech 
 
The realm of judges’ extrajudicial speech is vast and such speech takes on a variety of 
different forms. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say there are two broad 
                                               
37 Hammond Judicial Recusal, above n 24, at 77.  
38 Elias, above n 7, at [23]. 
39 Saxmere, above n 17, at [88]. 
40 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [28]. 
41 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [27]. 
42 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [29] and Hammond Judicial Recusal, above n 24, at 
42. 
43 Christopher Forsyth “Judges, Bias and Recusal in the United Kingdom” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 361 at 375. 
44 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [29]. 
45 Hammond Judicial Recusal, above n 24, at 88. 
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categories of extrajudicial speech. The first is political speech and the second is 
contributions to academia.   
 
Political speech refers to situations where judges comment on current political issues 
and controversial subjects.46 In New Zealand, the classic example is Sian Elias’ Shirley 
Smith Address, where she discussed criminal sentencing policy and advocated for a 
policy of containment to deal with prison overcrowding.47 The Chief Justice was 
heavily criticised by politicians and the media for, in the words of the Prime Minister 
the Rt Hon John Key, “straying into the Justice Minister’s area” by commenting on 
sentencing policy.48 The reason why judicial political speech is seen as inappropriate 
relates to Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers, which posits that the three 
branches of government should be separate from, and act as a check on, each other.  
When a judge speaks in a political fashion, he blurs the line between the judiciary and 
the other two branches of government, imperilling the independence of the judiciary 
itself. This is a worrying concept. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to further 
analyse political speech, other than to note the Judges’ Bench Book suggests judges 
should not generally participate in public debate.49 Instead, the focus of this essay is on 
judges’ extrajudicial contributions to academia. 
 
Judges’ academic writing and speaking spans many different topics and a variety of 
different modes. With regards to the latter, a judge may be published in law reviews, 
serve as editor of a textbook, publish his own text or give public lectures and speak at 
conferences. It is useful to divide academic writing and speaking into four further 
subject categories. First, judges may write on the law and current legal issues. Second, 
a judge may write on the history of the law, including biographical or autobiographical 
content or write eulogies of notable individuals in the legal profession. Third, a judge 
may write on the judicial process, the courts and the administration of justice. Fourth, 
a judge may make non-legal extrajudicial contributions, for example, by writing on the 
arts or history.50 
 
This paper especially focuses on writing on legal issues. This kind of writing could 
create concerns regarding a judge’s impartiality. For example, a judge’s academic 
writing on the law may give rise to the apprehension he has predetermined a legal matter 
                                               
46 Russell Smyth “Judges and Academic Scholarship: An Empirical Study of the Academic Publication 
Patterns of Federal Court and High Court Judges” (2002) 2 QUTLJ 198 at 199. 
47 Hammond “Judges and free speech in New Zealand”, in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 195 at 201–202. 
48 Hammond “Judges and free speech”, above n 47, at 202. 
49 Hammond “Judges and free speech”, above n 47, at 197. 
50 Ronan Kennedy “Extra-Judicial Comment By Judges” [2005] JSIJ 199 at 212. 
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or suggest he is biased towards a particular class of claimant. Extrajudicial writing on 
the history of the law is less contentious, being less likely to raise bias and recusal 
issues. Likewise, writing on the legal system is uncontroversial and should be noted for 
its value, given the unique perspective judges hold. Lastly, writing on the arts or history 
raises no issues with bias provided the judge is not trying to “promote a particular 
agenda.”51  
B The Issues Raised by Extrajudicial Speech 
 
Academic speech may pose serious questions for a judge’s impartiality by satisfying 
the requirements of actual or apparent bias.52 If a judge has extrajudicially expressed 
an opinion on a legal issue, which later comes before him for adjudication, the judge 
may have already decided the matter for himself. That is to say, the judge may actually 
be biased by the content of his extrajudicial speech. Given that actual bias is rare and 
difficult to prove, this possibility seems unlikely. More plausibly, instead of a judge 
being actually biased, the off-bench commentary may give rise to the appearance the 
judge is biased and unable to bring an impartial mind to deciding the case. This would 
satisfy the Saxmere test.  
 
If a judge appears to be biased, on the basis of extrajudicial statements, he should recuse 
himself. If he does not, a party to the proceedings may request his disqualification or 
may later challenge the judgment issued for judicial bias. The latter is precisely what 
occurred in the English case of Timmins v Gormley, where the defendant challenged a 
judgment issued against him for bias arising from the judge’s publications in law 
reviews.53 As alluded to above, the possibility of bias and the need for recusal could 
arise in respect of two distinct matters. First, the judge’s extrajudicial writing may 
discuss a particular aspect of the law, which may create the impression a judge is biased 
as to a relevant legal issue in the case. Second, and quite separate to that, a judge may 
have suggested he is biased towards or against a certain person or category of people 
who later appear in a case before him. For example, a judge may appear biased towards 
claimants in personal injury cases and against doctors giving evidence for insurers in 
those cases.54 
 
                                               
51 Kennedy, above n 50, at 212. 
52 As outlined in Part II. 
53 Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451. Locabail was a test case on bias heard 
by the English Court of Appeal, consisting of a number of appeals, of which Timmins v Gormley was 
one. The case is discussed further in this Part and in Part IV. 
54 A similar issue arose in Timmins v Gormley, see below.  
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Given that judges are often prolific legal writers and, especially on the appellate 
benches, a popular choice for public speeches and lectures, there is considerable 
potential for these problems to arise. However, the scope of this problem does not 
appear to be particularly large in New Zealand. The author has undertaken a survey of 
the extent of judicial publication in leading New Zealand law journals. Across the time 
period 2004 to 2014, any article authored by a sitting judge of the New Zealand Courts 
has been recorded.55 The results of this survey are summarised in the Appendices. 
 
A number of preliminary observations can be drawn from the survey. First, and most 
importantly, it is clear judges are published occasionally, but not frequently, in New 
Zealand law reviews. Over the last eleven years, on average six articles by judges were 
published annually.56 This is not a large amount. However, the limitations of this survey 
should be noted. In particular, the survey was limited to only twelve New Zealand law 
reviews.57 It did not include any public speeches or lectures judges give.58 Likewise, 
papers delivered at conferences,59 publications in foreign law reviews and textbooks 
authored or edited by judges were not included. Instances of extrajudicial writing would 
undoubtedly be found in these sources with the result that the total number of 
publications would be greater. Second, judges write on a variety of subjects. These have 
been categorised in Appendix 4, into four categories – specific legal topics,60 procedural 
                                               
55 By New Zealand Courts, the author refers to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, District 
Court and the specialist courts (Environment Court, Family Court, Maori Land Court and Youth Court).   
56 See Appendix 1. 
57 These were: the Auckland University Law Review, Canterbury Law Review, Maori Law Review, New 
Zealand Intellectual Property Law Journal, New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law, New Zealand 
Journal of Family Law, New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law, New Zealand Law 
Review, New Zealand Universities Law Review, Otago Law Review, Victoria University Law Review, 
Waikato Law Review.  
58 Although, it is acknowledged that speeches or lectures given by judges are sometimes reproduced in 
law reviews and therefore, to some extent, are implicitly included in the results collected.  
59 Speeches and papers delivered at conferences can be accessed on the Courts of New Zealand website 
(www.courtsofnz.govt.nz).  
60 For example, Jan Doogue “Sections 15 and 15A of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 – six years 
on: certainty or uncertainty?” (2007) 5 NZFLJ 282; Peter Boshier “Have judges been missing the point 
and allowing relocation too readily?” (2010) 6 NZFLJ 334 and Anna-Marie Skellern “The Climate 
Change Response Act 2002: The Origin and Evolution of s 3A – The Treaty Clause” (2012) 10 NZJPIL 
167. 
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topics,61 historical or biographical topics, 62 and other topics.63 As suggested above, this 
means not all extrajudicial writing will create problems with bias and recusal; plainly, 
for example, historical or biographical writing will not. The writing on specific legal 
topics is most likely to create these problems and approximately 36 percent of the 
articles were on this topic.64 In addition to these two conclusions, further implications 
ascertained from this survey will be discussed throughout the paper.  
 
On the whole, the empirical research shows it is not uncommon for judges to write 
extrajudicially. That, in combination with the accepted understanding that judges can 
and do write and speak off the bench, requires further scrutiny be given to this area. It 
is important that judges are put on notice of the possible repercussions of extrajudicial 
commentary and that the boundaries and guidelines governing this area, as far as they 
can be, are ascertained. This is especially true for the judges who have a tendency to 
write extrajudicially. The results of the survey show that nearly half of all the articles 
published by judges were authored by Peter Boshier, former Principal Judge of the 
Family Court, and Elias CJ.65 That being said, the smaller scope of the problem in New 
Zealand obviously affects the analysis and the results of the empirical survey will be 
discussed in this regard, in subsequent parts.  
 
The following subpart provides real world examples, from New Zealand and abroad, of 
the bias and recusal problems caused by extrajudicial speech. 
  
                                               
61 For example, Jan Doogue “A seismic shift or minor realignment? A view from the bench ascertaining 
children’s views” (2006) 5 NZFLJ 198; Peter Boshier “Transforming dispute resolution in the Family 
Court” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 53; Graham Panckhurst “A Sentencing Council: Enlightened or Folly” (2008) 
14 Canta LR 191 and Andrew Becroft “Access to Youth Justice in New Zealand: ‘The Very Good, the 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly’” (2011) 18 Auckland U L Rev 23. 
62 For example, Sian Elias “The Life in Law of George Paterson Barton QC” (2012) 43 VUWLR 3; Ned 
Fletcher and Sian Elias “A Collusive Suit to “Cofound the Rights of Property Through the Length and 
Breadth of the Colony”?: Busby v White (1859)” (2010) 41 VUWLR 563 and Sian Elias “Eulogy for the 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon” (2008) 39 VUWLR 1. 
63 Other topics included articles on issues that were too board to be categorised as a specific legal topic, 
such as writing on the constitution or human rights. For example, Sian Elias “Mapping the 
Constitutional” [2014] NZ L Rev 1; E T Durie “The Rule of Law, Biculturalism and Multiculturalism” 
(2005) 13 Wai L Rev 14 and Peter Boshier and Julia Spelman “What’s gender got to do with it in New 
Zealand family law?” (2011) 7 NZFLJ 61. 
64 See Appendix 4. The author notes there is always the possibility that writing on procedural or other 
issues could lead to an apprehension of bias or necessitate recusal, however this is less likely than writing 
on specific legal issues.  
65 See Appendix 3. 
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1 New Zealand: Judge David Harvey 
 
As referred to in Part I, the leading New Zealand example of recusal necessitated by 
extrajudicial speech relates to Judge Harvey’s July 2012 speech at the NetHui 
Convention.66 Judge Harvey was due to hear Kim Dotcom’s extradition hearing, 
scheduled for March 2013, when he spoke at the Convention.67 The Judge, an 
intellectual property law specialist, discussed the projected effect of the Trans Pacific 
Partnership on New Zealand’s copyright laws, specifically relating to region coding on 
DVDs. The Judge commented that the United States’ negotiating position in this regard 
was particularly stringent. As a play on cartoonist Walt Kelly’s famous punch line, “we 
have met the enemy and he is us”, Judge Harvey concluded his speech by saying “we 
have met the enemy and he is U.S.”68 
 
This offhand remark received extensive and unfavourable media coverage. For 
example, a New Zealand Herald headline declared “US ‘the enemy’ says Dotcom 
judge”.69 Jonathan Temm, President of the Law Society, criticised the media reporting, 
seeing it as unnecessarily sensationalist and as causing questions to arise over the 
Judge’s impartiality.70 Applying the Saxmere test, a fair-minded lay observer might 
think Judge Harvey would not bring an open mind to deciding the extradition case 
because of a personal bias against one of the parties – the United States. As a result of 
this and the widespread publicity, Judge Harvey chose to recuse himself from the case, 
noting the statement “could reflect on his impartiality”.71 While commentators accepted 
this was the right result,72 they lamented the loss of Judge Harvey, given he is an internet 
law expert and therefore best placed to hear the case. 
 
This incident demonstrates that a few words, in an off the cuff remark during a speech, 
can have drastic implications for bias and recusal. At the time Judge Harvey made the 
                                               
66 District Court Judge, sitting in Auckland.  
67 For clarity, Kim Dotcom was the founder of a now defunct website that allowed users to share pirated 
files over the internet. He is wanted by United States’ authorities on charges of criminal copyright 
infringement, racketeering and money laundering. The United States is currently seeking his extradition. 
68 Chris Keall “What Judge Harvey said” (19 July 2012) The National Business Review 
<www.nbr.co.nz>. 
69 Hamish Fletcher “US ‘the enemy’ says Dotcom judge” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
16 July 2012).  
70 Radio New Zealand “Morning Report” (19 July 2012) Radio New Zealand <www.radionz.co.nz>. 
71 David Fisher “Dotcom judge quits the case” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 18 July 
2012). 
72 For example, Grant Illingworth QC, who noted that although Judge Harvey was making a joke, the 
comment could lead to one of the parties to the litigation feeling that the judge was biased against them. 
Radio New Zealand, above n 70. 
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comments, he was not specifically referring to Kim Dotcom, nor any of the issues raised 
by his extradition case. He was speaking within the niche area of region coding on 
DVDs and the United States’ negotiating position on this. In an earlier appearance at 
the conference, Judge Harvey refused to comment on the extradition hearing on two 
separate occasions when prompted by the audience.73 The Judge had, with the exception 
of one minor slip in judgement, behaved with absolute propriety. 
2 England: Timmins v Gormley 
 
Timmins v Gormley concerned a negligence action in respect of a traffic accident. The 
claimant, Timmins, claimed damages from the defendant, Gormley, for personal injury 
and special damages for her lost earnings.74 The amount alleged was £200,000.75 Mr 
Recorder Braithwaite QC, a part-time judge, found for the plaintiff and awarded 
£227,000 in damages.76  The defendant brought a cause of action alleging apparent bias. 
The Recorder practised in personal injury cases, mostly on behalf of claimants, was the 
consultant editor of the leading textbook on personal injury law and had written 
innumerable articles on the subject.77 The bias was specifically said to arise from a 
small number of articles evidencing a pro-claimant, anti-insurer attitude.78 The 
defendant argued there was the risk the Recorder was “influenced by an unconscious 
but settled prejudice against the insurers of the defendant” who were the de facto 
defendants in the case.79 In one article, the Recorder was “highly critical of the conduct 
of the defendant’s insurers” in a particular case and described their conduct as 
demonstrating “just how badly these cases can be managed”.80 
 
The Court of Appeal in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd, characterised the 
case as difficult to resolve and causing “particular concern”.81 No doubt this was 
because there was no suggestion of actual bias or a lack of good faith on the Recorder’s 
part. In fact, he disclosed to the defendant all relevant information which may have led 
the defendant to request another judge. This included the Recorder’s membership of the 
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, which typically represented claimants, and his 
past experience cross-examining the defendant’s expert witness in a way that caused 
                                               
73 Russell Brown “Judge Harvey: My part in his downfall” (19 July 2012) Public Address 
<www.publicaddress.net>. 
74 Locabail, above n 53, at [73]. 
75 At [73]. 
76 At [71]. 
77 At [75]. 
78 At [76]–[79]. 
79 At [72]. 
80 At [79]. 
81 At [71] and [89]. 
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offence.82 The defendant waived any objection to these factors, although the Court 
recognised the defendant was unaware of the articles and could not waive an objection 
based on them.83 
 
In the Court’s opinion, the articles demonstrated the Recorder was “very sympathetic” 
to claimants in personal injury cases.84 A retrial was ordered because a lay observer 
could not have excluded the possibility that:85 
 
A person holding the pronounced pro-claimant anti-insurer views expressed by the 
Recorder in the articles might not unconsciously have leant in favour of the 
claimant and against the defendant in resolving the issues between them.  
 
In other words, the apparent bias test was satisfied: the Recorder’s extrajudicial 
academic writing would lead a fair-minded lay observer to think he could not bring an 
open mind because of a bias against one of the parties.  
3 Scotland: Hoekstra v H.M. Advocate (No 3) 
 
In Hoekstra v H.M. Advocate (No 3), the defendants were convicted of drug offences. 
The defendants appealed to the High Court of Justiciary on a number of grounds, one 
of which invoked Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: the right to respect for private and family life. This was relevant because 
part of the evidence used to convict the defendants included covert surveillance 
evidence gathered by the police.86 This ground of appeal was rejected by the bench of 
three judges hearing the case, one of whom was Lord McCluskey. The bench was 
scheduled to hear the other grounds of appeal in a later hearing. Shortly after the first 
decision was issued, an article by Lord McCluskey was published in Scotland on 
Sunday, where he described the European Convention as a “Trojan Horse”.87 
Elaborating, Lord McCluskey described the effect of adopting the Convention as 
“devastating” and remarked:88 
 
Somebody suggested to me that it was a bit like sailing in the Titanic toward a 
legal iceberg. My own fear is that the better simile is with an avalanche; all we can 
                                               
82 At [82]. 
83 At [82]. 
84 At [78]. 
85 At [89]. 
86 Hoekstra v H.M. Advocate (No 3) 2000 SLT 605 (HC) at [21]. 
87 At [8]. 
88 At [9]. 
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hear at the moment is a distant roar; but it is coming and we are going to have to 
struggle to avoid being buried in new claims of right. 
 
Lord McCluskey specifically referred to Art 8, criticising it for protecting “everyone”, 
including “those whom the police are pursuing because they believe them to be drug 
dealers…”89  
 
Following publication of the article, the defendants applied to have the bench 
disqualified from hearing the rest of the appeal.90 It was argued that Lord McCluskey 
could not be seen as impartial in relation to any future cases invoking rights under the 
Convention.91 Further, the defendants contended that the earlier decision of the Court 
breached their right to be tried by an impartial tribunal under Art 6(1) of the Convention, 
due to apparent bias on Lord McCluskey’s part.92 This issue was accordingly put before 
a differently constituted court for consideration. 
 
This court found the apparent bias test was clearly satisfied by Lord McCluskey’s 
statements, which suggested he was opposed to the Convention and its rights.93 The 
importance of the specific reference to Art 8 was underlined as it directly related to the 
case.94 Here, a fair-minded lay observer would think Lord McCluskey would be unable 
to bring an open mind to the case due to bias against the Convention and therefore the 
defendants in the case. As a result of this finding, the appeal decision was quashed and 
Lord McCluskey was barred from taking any further part the appeal process.95 
4 The United States: Justice Scalia 
 
Justice Scalia, a Supreme Court judge, has been embroiled in controversy because of 
his extrajudicial statements on two occasions. The first centres on the case of Elk Grove 
v Newdow,96 where the issue was whether the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance breached the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment97 to the 
Constitution.98 The Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit found the Establishment 
                                               
89 At [10]. 
90 At [2]. 
91 At [11]. 
92 At [11]. 
93 At [22]. 
94 At [10]. 
95 At [24]. 
96 524 U.S. 1 (2004). 
97 That “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”. 
98 Todd Collins “Lost in the Forest of the Establishment Clause: Elk Grove v Newdow” (2004) 27 
Campbell L Rev 1 at 2. 
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Clause was breached.99 Justice Scalia, speaking at a religious freedom event sponsored 
by the Knights of Columbus, criticised this decision, emphatically stating the 
consequence of the decision – removing God from the Pledge of Allegiance – was 
“contrary to our whole tradition”.100  
 
At the time, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had not been granted. However, once 
the case did come before the Court, the possibility was raised that Justice Scalia’s 
comments, if not leading to actual bias, would satisfy the apparent bias test.101 In line 
with this, and in what was undoubtedly the correct decision, Justice Scalia recused 
himself from the case.102 Recusal was particularly warranted because Justice Scalia had 
gone beyond just expressing an opinion on a legal issue, he was referring specifically 
to and criticising the case which later came before him. 
 
However, this result is in stark contrast to his behaviour in Hamdan v Rumsfeld.103 In 
this case, Hamdan, an enemy combatant, captured in Afghanistan and detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, had filed a writ of habeas corpus and challenged the legality of the 
military trials at Guantanamo Bay, arguing they were inconsistent with provisions in 
the Geneva Convention.104 After the case was before the Supreme Court, and three 
weeks before oral arguments were to begin, Justice Scalia gave a speech at a university 
where he remarked during a question and answer session, “war is war and it has never 
been the case that when you capture a combatant you have to give them a jury trial in 
your courts… Give me a break.”105 Justice Scalia went on to say, when challenged by 
an audience member about the Geneva Convention:106 
 
If he was captured by my army on a battlefield, that is where he belongs.  I had a 
son on that battlefield107 and they were shooting at my son and I’m not about to 
give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial.  I mean it’s crazy. 
 
 
                                               
99 Collins, above n 98, at 2. 
100 David G Savage “High Court to Decide School’s Pledge” The Los Angeles Times (online ed, Los 
Angeles, 15 October 2003).  
101 The precise wording of the test for bias and the standard for recusal differs in the United States to 
New Zealand. Broadly speaking, in the United States a judge should recuse himself where “his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See generally, Flanagan, above n 6, at 153. 
102 Flanagan, above n 6, at 155. 
103 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
104 Flanagan, above n 6, at 150. 
105 Flanagan, above n 6, at 150. 
106 Flanagan, above n 6, at 151. 
107 Justice Scalia’s son, Matthew, did in fact serve in Iraq. 
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Justice Scalia’s comments easily satisfy the apparent bias test. A fair-minded lay 
observer would apprehend Justice Scalia might not bring an impartial mind to 
adjudicating Hamdan’s situation. This is the clearest example of apparent bias of the 
four examples mentioned in this paper. Further, this is a situation where actual bias 
could be alleged – there is compelling evidence that Justice Scalia is so predisposed 
against Hamdan that he cannot bring an open mind. However, Justice Scalia refused to 
recuse himself, even when called upon to do so by Counsel for Hamdan.108 The 
Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Hamdan, by a margin of 5-3,109 and 
unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia joined the dissent.110 This is a concerning result and had 
the Court found against Hamdan, it is hard to imagine a bias challenge would not have 
been mounted. 
C An Additional Problem with Extrajudicial Speech: Signalling 
 
These four examples evidence that extrajudicial speech creates serious implications for 
bias and recusal. In addition to this, Bartie and Gava argue extrajudicial academic 
writing raises a further problem with ‘signalling’. This is essentially a question of 
motives as to why a judge would want to write extrajudicially on a point of law. Bartie 
and Gava suggest two possible answers. First, a judge may want to highlight a defect 
in the current law where litigation would be “welcomed”.111 This turns the traditionally 
passive role of judges on its head and moves from a system where judges wait for a 
litigant to bring a dispute, to one where judges “openly advertise” disputes they want 
litigated.112 Second, a judge may be signalling to lower courts how a specific legal issue 
should be resolved.113 A High Court judge, for example, in deciding a legal question, 
will likely be influenced by the extrajudicial writing of a Supreme Court judge on that 
point. Bartie and Gava conclusively reject that a judge would write purely for scholarly 
debate and instead believe the judge has a motive – to “prove a point or correct the 
record.”114 
 
Signalling is of much less consequence than the concerns over bias and recusal and is 
nowhere near as realistic as Bartie and Gava suggest. It is doubtful a judge would use 
extrajudicial academic writing purely as a vehicle to signal to litigants the issues the 
                                               
108 Flanagan, above n 6, at 151. 
109 Interestingly, Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from hearing the appeal as he had heard the case 
while sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia. 
110 Flanagan, above n 6, at 151. 
111 Susan Bartie and John Gava “Some Problems with Extrajudicial Writing” (2012) 34 Syd L Rev 637 
at 651. 
112 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 658. 
113 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 642. 
114 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 642. 
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judge wants to see before him in court. This is based on practical considerations. It 
seems unlikely a would-be litigant, with the perfect test case, would read the judge’s 
extrajudicial writing and decide to bring litigation just because of the view the judge 
expressed. Even if litigation was brought, there is no guarantee the judge who wrote 
about the legal issue would hear the case. In fact, for most judges, the question of what 
cases they hear is out of their control and vested in someone else.115 Given these factors, 
it is nonsensical a judge would invest time and energy in writing an article purely to 
signal to litigants. 
 
The argument that lower court judges will consider the extrajudicial writing of senior 
judges in their decisions is less tenuous. It is commonplace for judges to consult the 
work of academics,116 as well as case law, in determining what the law on a particular 
issue is. Therefore, it is not an especially worrying practice for judges to consult the 
academic work of other judges. However, there would be cause for concern if lower 
court judges gave undue weight to this work by reason of its authorship. This is 
presumably what Bartie and Gava are worried about. For example, in deciding an 
unresolved legal issue, a High Court judge cites two conflicting academic opinions – 
one of a university professor and one of a Court of Appeal judge. If the High Court 
judge favoured the latter opinion solely because the author was a judge, this would be 
an undesirable outcome. McCormick considers the position of a trial judge and 
hypothesises as to how he may react when faced with this situation:117 
 
If I ignore them [the academic writings of a superior judge], I am possibly 
subjecting the winners of the case to the bother and the delay of an appeal… Even 
if the end result is the same as that of the original trial, that is no small 
inconvenience. Worse, if the appeal is allowed, the Appeal Court will say that it is 
because the trial judge… did not do the job properly, and this will be a major 
professional embarrassment to me, both in the eyes of my fellow judges and in 
terms of my own self-opinion. 
 
It is clear this kind of illegitimate reasoning should not be encouraged. However, 
McCormick may state the position too strongly in assuming lower court judges fear 
being overturned so much they would follow the extrajudicial opinion of a superior 
judge for that reason alone.  
 
                                               
115 For more information on the allocation of cases to judges in New Zealand see Petra Butler “The 
Assignment of Cases to Judges” (2003) 1 NZJPIL 83. 
116 See generally Grant Hammond “Judges and Academics in New Zealand” (2013) 25 NZULR 681. 
117 Peter McCormick “Judges, Journals and Exegesis: Judicial Leadership and Academic Scholarship” 
(1996) 45 UNBLJ 139 at 142. 
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The more likely possibility is that a judge will treat extrajudicial writing of judges as 
having more weight than the work of ‘mere’ academics. That is to say, the writings of 
judges, because of their occupation, may be seen as more authoritative than the work 
of university professors. Smith lends support to this idea, noting judges are regarded by 
most as “having attained the pinnacle of the legal profession”, and therefore their 
statements are viewed as having “additional weight”.118 McCormick believes this 
outcome is prevented if “both the judges who write and the scholars who read… 
remember that the gown is left behind in the table of contents.”119 In other words, a 
judge, reading another judge’s academic work, should ignore its authorship and treat 
the work as having the same standing as any other piece of academic writing.  
 
While this proposition has normative appeal, Smyth labels McCormick as “naïve” for 
suggesting it would actually occur.120 Instead, Smyth postulates the distinction between 
“the role of ‘judge as judge’ and ‘judge as commentator’” is often “blurred”, especially 
when dealing with the most senior judges.121 A judge cannot help but give weight to 
the extrajudicial writing of appellate judges. This is a possibility in New Zealand as 
appellate judges write and speak extrajudicially more frequently than lower court 
judges. The empirical research conducted shows that of the four main courts,122 two 
thirds of the extrajudicial writing was by judges of the Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeal.123 Therefore, there is a possibility High Court and District Court judges could 
be influenced by the writing. Taking a step back, it is impossible to know whether lower 
court judges treat the extrajudicial work of senior judges as more persuasive than other 
academics and would give preference to the judicial view because of its authorship. 
Nonetheless, the possibility judges will behave in this way cannot be excluded.  
 
This issue is resolved by returning to the question of motives. There is cause for concern 
if appellate judges only write in the hope that lower court judges will blindly implement 
their academic opinions. Conversely, the behaviour is less concerning if a judge writes 
for his own reasons and as an unintended side effect, a trial judge gives the opinion 
more weight. It is not the academic writing that is problematic in the latter scenario, 
rather it is the trial judge’s behaviour. Bartie and Gava take an oversimplified, and 
indeed pessimistic approach, by stating judges solely write to signal. By discounting 
the potential that judges write for the scholarly debate they are unduly suspicious of the 
                                               
118 Beverley Smith “Judicial Free Speech in Canada” (1996) 45 UNBLJ 161 at 162. 
119 McCormick, above n 117, at 146. 
120 Smyth, above n 46, at 201.  
121 Smyth, above n 46, at 203. 
122 That is, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court and District Court.  
123 See Appendix 2, Table 2.3. Supreme Court judges authored 42% of the published articles; Court of 
Appeal judges accounted for 24%; High Court judges produced 21% and the remaining 13% were 
District Court judges. 
23 
 
judiciary. The possibility judges write for intellectual satisfaction, to test legal 
arguments, or to keep themselves alert to legal developments cannot be excluded. Bartie 
and Gava give no reasons as to why judges do not write for these motivations.  
 
The forgoing demonstrates the signalling problem is not compelling, especially in 
regard to litigants. The problems relating to bias and recusal are much more pressing.  
 
IV Current Regulation of Extrajudicial Speech 
 
This Part considers how the law responds to the problems posed by extrajudicial speech. 
The current position is ascertained by reference to judicial conduct codes and case law. 
Scholarly writings on this topic are also considered. 
A Judicial Conduct Codes 
 
Judicial conduct codes do not contain enforceable rules, but rather exist to guide judges’ 
behaviour by providing practical advice in areas of uncertainty. This Part considers the 
equivalent codes from New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom and the 
recommendations made in terms of extrajudicial speech. 
 
At a general level, all three codes offer corresponding advice on recusal based on 
extrajudicial statements. The New Zealand Guidelines puts the position broadly, stating 
a judge “should consider disqualifying himself or herself if the case concerns a matter 
upon which the judge has made public statements of firm opinion.”124 The Australian 
Guide to Judicial Conduct and the United Kingdom Supreme Court Guide to Judicial 
Conduct offer identical views: a judge should disqualify where he has expressed “strong 
views on topics that are relevant to issues in the case by reason of public statements”;125 
where he has “committed himself… to a particular view”.126 The New Zealand 
Guidelines provide further direction to help judges decide whether an expressed opinion 
is “firm” or “strong”. Specifically, the Saxmere test will not be satisfied by a judge’s 
out of court statement unless the expression of the opinion was “extreme and 
unbalanced”.127  
 
The New Zealand and Australian codes make specific provision for participation in 
academic writing and legal teaching, which raises similar bias issues. This extrajudicial 
                                               
124 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [39]. 
125 The Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated Guide to Judicial Conduct (William 
Troedel & Company Pty Ltd, Victoria, 2002) at [3.4]. 
126 “Guide to Judicial Conduct” (2009) The Supreme Court <http://www.supremecourt.uk> at [3.14].  
127 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [39]. 
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activity is “not objectionable”.128 However, the New Zealand Guidelines reiterate a 
judge should be careful not to articulate “firm views” about issues that may come before 
the court and should ensure he avoids the “appearance of pre-determining” issues.129 In 
a similar vein, the Australian Guide specifies, in the context of legal teaching, that if 
there is a “difference of views, discretion will have to be exercised – particularly where 
the lecturer may later have to decide the question as a judge.”130 Although not expressly 
stated in the Guide, this direction would seemingly apply equally to academic writing 
– when writing on a contentious area of the law, where legal minds differ, judges would 
need to exercise the same discretion. By comparison, the United Kingdom’s Guide is 
silent on this issue.  
 
Further specific restrictions on extrajudicial speech can be discerned from the Judges’ 
Bench Book. These relate to comments on matters of public controversy, select 
committee submissions and comments pertaining to a judge’s own judgment.131 These 
will be discussed, in more depth, in Part V. 
B Case Law 
 
A number of cases across Commonwealth jurisdictions have grappled with the issues 
extrajudicial speech poses. The leading decision is the English Court of Appeal in 
Locabail.132 The Court observed that it was not possible to conclusively list the factors 
that could give rise to bias as each case is fact dependent.133 With this caveat in place, 
the Court characterised “extra-curricular utterances, whether in textbooks, lectures, 
speeches, articles, interviews, reports or responses to consultation papers” as factors 
that would be “ordinarily unchallengeable”.134 While this appears to dispense with the 
issue, it should not be taken as the ratio of the case, or indeed as a stringent rule. This 
is because the Court found, on the facts of Timmins, that apparent bias arose from the 
Recorder’s publications in law reviews. 
 
In respect of Timmins, the Court cautioned that a judge who writes extrajudicially in 
the area in which he adjudicates “must be circumspect in the language he uses and the 
tone in which he expresses himself.”135 The aim is to avoid the appearance the judge 
                                               
128 “Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [66] and Guide to Judicial Conduct, above n 125, at 
[5.7].  
129 ‘Guidelines for Judicial Conduct”, above n 5, at [66] and [100]. 
130 Guide to Judicial Conduct, above n 125, at [5.8]. 
131 Hammond “Judges and free speech”, above n 47, at 196-7. 
132 Above n 53. The facts of one of the cases in Locabail, Timmins v Gormley, are stated in Part III. 
133 At [25]. 
134 At [25] and Kate Malleson “Safeguarding judicial impartiality” (2002) 22 LS 53 at 61. 
135 At [85]. 
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“has preconceived views which are so firmly held that it may not be possible for him 
to try a case with an open mind.”136 The Court concluded it would always be 
“inappropriate” for a judge to “use intemperate language about subjects on which he 
has adjudicated or will have to adjudicate.”137 Despite these concerns, it was suggested 
that extrajudicial writing was not inconsistent with the judicial function.138 The Court 
extolled the benefits of extrajudicial writing, as “further[ing] rather than hinder[ing] the 
administration of justice.”139 It was purely the tone of the opinion and the “trenchancy” 
evident in its expression which led to the apparent bias finding.140 Malleson critiques 
this decision insofar as the Court was suggesting academic writing is ordinarily 
unchallengeable. This conclusion is undermined by the reasoning of the Court which 
demonstrates there is a fine distinction between harmless academic writing and writing 
that gives rise to an apprehension of bias.141 
 
The statements in Locabail are almost interchangeable with the direction expressed in 
the Guidelines. Judges are welcome to write or speak extrajudicially in an academic 
capacity. However, that writing can lead to an apprehension of bias, satisfying the 
Saxmere test. The focus is on the expression of the writing and requires the judge to 
choose his words carefully. The language and tone employed must not be so 
“intemperate” or “trenchant” so as to suggest the judge has preconceived views and 
cannot bring an open mind. In Timmins, the tone of the Recorder’s articles implied he 
had strong pro-claimant anti-insurer views, which led to the possibility the Recorder 
might not bring an open mind, due to bias against one of the parties – the defendant. 
 
Another notable case is Hoekstra.142 The Scottish High Court of Justiciary found 
apparent bias existed, based on Lord McCluskey’s newspaper article which articulated 
his negative views on the European Convention. Similarly to Locabail, the Court 
reached this conclusion based on the way Lord McCluskey’s opinion was expressed. 
“Particular importance” was attached to the “tone of the language” and Lord 
McCluskey’s deliberately given impression that “his hostility to… the Convention…is 
both longstanding and deep seated.”143 Comparatively, if Lord McCluskey had 
published an article in a law review highlighting the drawbacks of the Convention in a 
moderate manner, no objection could be raised.144 As in Locabail, the difference was 
                                               
136 At [85]. 
137 At [85]. 
138 At [85]. 
139 At [85]. 
140 At [85]. 
141 Malleson, above n 134, at 61. 
142 Above n 86. The facts of Hoekstra are summarised in Part III.  
143 At [23]. 
144 At [23]. 
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that the nature and language of the writing suggested he could not be impartial in 
deciding cases relating to the Convention.145  
 
This reiterates it is the mode of expression of extrajudicial writing that leads to a finding 
of apparent bias. Extrajudicial writing, in which a judge points out defects in the current 
law, or describes the benefits of the current law, in a moderate manner, is acceptable. 
The significance of Hoekstra, and the reason for its inclusion in this paper, is that the 
case concerned extrajudicial statements regarding the law that led to a finding of 
apparent bias. It was not, as in Timmins, a bias towards a particular class of defendant,146 
but rather prejudgment of a legal issue.  
 
The New Zealand Courts have not yet addressed a case with similar facts, however the 
Courts have cited Locabail with approval.147 In Australia, cases dealing with the extra-
curricular utterances of judges, have cited and followed Locabail.148 As such, if similar 
facts to Locabail or Hoekstra occurred in New Zealand, it is likely the Court would 
adopt the guidance in the cases (and the Guidelines), by focussing on the tone and 
expression of the extrajudicial comment.  
C Academic Opinion 
 
The prevailing academic opinion is in conformity with the guidance provided by 
judicial conduct codes and case law. That is, a presumption in favour of extrajudicial 
speech and writing, with the warning that judges should be careful to avoid his or her 
comments being a basis for a finding of bias or necessitating recusal.149  
 
However, academic writing is more prescriptive in that academics have attempted to 
create a checklist of factors judges should consider before commenting extrajudicially. 
These factors emphasise that the context and forum in which the judge is speaking or 
writing is as important as the content of the extrajudicial commentary. As Kennedy 
                                               
145 At [23]. 
146 Although, it should be noted that Lord McCluskey’s statement regarding the operation of Art 9 could 
be interpreted as a bias against a class of defendants – drug dealers. 
147 See for example Muir v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 3 and Director of Proceedings v 
Parry [2002] 2 NZLR 249. 
148 See for example Gaudie v Local Court of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1425 and Newcastle City 
Council v Lindsay [2004] NSWCA 198. 
149 See generally Kennedy, above n 50; William G Ross “Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries 
of Propriety” (1998) 2 Geo J Legal Ethics 589; Albert Tate Jr “The Propriety of Off-Bench Judicial 
Writing or Speaking on Legal or Quasi-Legal Issues” (1979) 3 J Legal Prof 17 and Jonathan Lippman 
“The Judge and Extrajudicial Conduct: Challenges, Lessons Learned and a Proposed Framework for 
Assessing the Propriety of Pursuing Activities Beyond the Bench” (2012) 33 Cardozo L Rev 1342. 
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notes “the wrong event, publication or audience can make innocuous remarks seem 
quite inappropriate.”150 Collectively, these are known as time, manner and place 
restrictions. 
 
The first consideration is whether extrajudicial commentary should be spoken or 
written. Academics agree public lectures and speeches are riskier because judges are 
less likely to be measured in their remarks.151 In particular, speeches create the 
opportunity for “spontaneous statements” and the possibility the “judge will misspeak 
or abandon discretion in follow up questions.”152 A distinct, but equally real concern is 
that a judge’s comments in a public speech will be taken out of context or be 
“misunderstood or misinterpreted” by the media, particular where the statement is 
ambiguous.153 These comments are compelling and one need look no further than Judge 
Harvey’s 2012 incident to see their force. Judge Harvey’s comment that the U.S. was 
the enemy was both a spontaneous statement and one that was subject to inaccurate and 
sensationalist media reporting. Likewise, Justice Scalia’s speech prior Hamdan 
provided the opportunity for audience questions, one involving the precise issue raised 
in the case. Despite these concerns, judges should of course be able to speak at 
conferences or give public lectures. However, when a judge chooses to do so, he should 
be particularly mindful of his comments and refrain from making impulsive remarks, 
especially in response to audience questions. 
 
The corollary of this is that writing is the better mode for extrajudicial expression. 
Written work enables a judge to carefully reflect on his remarks and is often subject to 
meticulous editing.154 This reduces the likelihood any improper statement will be 
included in the work. Further, judges should be careful to select the proper forum for 
their writing. For example, publication in a law review is more appropriate than writing 
for a tabloid newspaper.155 This common sense suggestion also has merit – newspaper 
articles often afford the opportunity for colourful writing, where a judge is more likely 
to use intemperate language. Lord McCluskey’s article in Scotland on Sunday provides 
one such example, where the judge used descriptive metaphors, which contributed to 
the apparent bias test being satisfied. By contrast, the tone of a law review is more 
scholarly, meaning judges will temper the language they use and the expression of their 
writing. Despite this, there is always the residual risk that even a law review publication 
could be the basis for a bias challenge, as was the case in Timmins. As such, Ross notes 
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“even in law reviews, a judge must be careful to avoid expressing any pronounced 
opinions”; there is always the need for caution.156   
 
These time, manner and place restrictions suggested by academics are useful 
elaborations on the offerings of judicial conduct codes and case law. Part V will 
consider whether rules contained in the Guidelines should be developed, one such 
possibility being the inclusion of context and forum rules.  
 
V Regulating Extrajudicial Speech: What are the Competing Interests at 
Stake? 
 
The preceding Part to this paper discussed the current regulation of extrajudicial speech. 
In sum, it is the tone and language used that matters – judges can express opinions as 
to the law extrajudicially, but must be moderate in their expression. This Part evaluates 
whether this position is desirable. In order to do so, the relevant interests affected by 
extrajudicial speech will be explored. These fall under two broad categories – judicial 
freedom of expression, which tends in favour of allowing extrajudicial speech, and the 
functioning of the legal system, which favours restricting it. These competing interests 
will be weighed to determine whether the current regulation strikes the right balance.  
A Freedom of Expression 
1 The current position 
 
In New Zealand, judges, like other citizens, enjoy the benefit of freedom of expression, 
conferred on them by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA).157 This can be 
assumed by the wording of s 14, which provides that freedom of expression applies to 
“everyone”. It is confirmed by the Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary,158 Art 9 of which stipulates “[m]embers of the judiciary are like other citizens 
entitled to freedom of expression…”159 Of course, the judicial right to freedom of 
expression is subject to limits; it is not absolute. Butler and Butler sanction this 
approach, stating “public actors can benefit from [NZBORA] in principle, but their 
ability to benefit is subject to the concept of practicability provided for in s 29… and 
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reasonable limits in s 5…”160 Section 5 provides that NZBORA rights “may be subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.” Any limit on judicial free speech must meet this 
condition.161 Likewise Hammond opines that the importance of free speech requires a 
compelling reason to limit the right – a “slight gain in total welfare will not do: there 
would have to be in some sense a very real overall welfare gain”.162 
 
A persuasive reason to limit the right is to ensure the values of judicial independence 
and impartiality are protected. The Basic Principles state freedom of expression is 
limited by the necessity that “judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner 
as to preserve the dignity of their office and impartiality and independence of the 
judiciary.”163 Of course, such limitations should be narrowly construed and only limit 
the right “no more than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the purpose of the 
limitation.164 Constitutional convention and rules laid down in the Judges’ Bench Book 
provide guidance on preserving judicial impartiality and independence. First, the Chief 
Justice, or Head of the Bench, with the Chief Justice’s approval, should be the one to 
comment on matters of public controversy requiring comment from the judiciary.165 
Second, while judges are free to make select committee submission on issues relevant 
to the judiciary, they should not comment on political matters.166 Third, judges are not 
to comment on the judgments they issue, which are meant to “stand without further 
clarification or explanation”.167   
 
Beyond these restrictions, it is of course accepted judges are free to record their 
opinions on the law in the context of a judgment. R v Pora is one example, where 
Thomas J described retroactive legislation as “repugnant to the rule of law”.168 
Hammond concludes judges enjoy this freedom outside the courtroom too.169 Similarly, 
in Hoekstra, the Court agreed judges could criticise or welcome developments in the 
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law extrajudicially.170 Such writing may frustrate the executive or embarrass judges, 
where their statements are incorrect,171 or even lead to the need to recusal. But, none of 
these provide a compelling reason to stop judges from writing extrajudicially. The 
accepted position in New Zealand, then, is that judges are entitled to free speech, as are 
other citizens. Reasonable limits may be imposed on this right to preserve judicial 
independence and impartiality, however the concerns associated with extrajudicial 
speech do not provide such a rationale.  
2 Reasons to protect judicial free speech 
 
It is necessary to consider why the right to judicial free speech should be protected. 
Generally, a number of justifications are advanced for protecting free speech.172 The 
most relevant justifications to judicial speech relate to truth and self-fulfilment.  
 
This argument from truth seeks to enable the discovery of truth. If freedom of 
expression is restricted, society is inhibited from discovering what the truth is.173 The 
theory has been recast as the “marketplace of ideas” in the United States, positing the 
best way to discover the truth is through an unrestricted flow of debate.174 In terms of 
judicial free speech, Hammond labels the argument from truth as “very powerful”, as 
there must be truth in justice.175 Hammond is referring specifically to speech within the 
confines of a judgment, where a judge comments on the injustice of the operation of a 
particular statute.176  
 
However, the argument applies equally to extrajudicial speech. Off the bench, judges 
make contributions to academia on particular legal issues. It is important there is a free 
flow of these ideas and that they are publicly available because of the educative benefit 
they provide. Judges are at the peak of the legal profession. They are highly skilled and 
hugely knowledgeable in the law, having studied and practised widely prior to their 
appointment to the bench. They are amongst the best legal minds in New Zealand. Their 
academic writing offers insight and exposes society to novel legal arguments. This work 
helps to educate academics, lawyers and even law students; its value cannot be 
understated. This argument is particularly persuasive in a New Zealand context where, 
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given the smaller size of the legal profession, we are reliant on the contributions judges 
make to academia. The empirical research collated shows this is especially true in the 
area of family law, where judges make significant contributions to the New Zealand 
Family Law Journal. 177 This is presumably because fewer academics specialise in this 
area and practitioners are often too busy to write, leading to a paucity of contributions. 
In such a situation, the extrajudicial writing of judges sitting on the Family Court 
benches is an invaluable resource to the legal profession.  
 
In addition to substantive legal issues, judges also write on procedural issues and the 
functioning of the justice system.178 This writing is equally valuable given the unique 
perspective judges possess. Judges witness how the legal system operates first hand and 
are best placed to comment on its deficiencies and the procedural problems that arise. 
It is important this writing is available, so that such issues can be known. For example, 
Judge Harvey, has recently written on the challenges posed to jury trials by the 
information jurors may access on the internet and how the Courts should respond.179 
This procedural issue is one that perhaps only judges are privy to, making their 
extrajudicial writing invaluable. Likewise, the New Zealand Family Law Journal 
contains numerous articles by judges on procedural issues, such as whether judges 
should meet with the children at the centre of Family Court cases.180 It is unsurprising 
that Mason, writing at the time he was a judge on the Court of Appeal of New South 
Wales, noted “significant contributions to the marketplace of ideas have been made in 
recent years by serving judges speaking or writing in their private capacities”.181 Ross 
goes as far as to say a “cloistered judiciary… would impoverish society”.182   
 
In contrast to the argument from truth, which focuses on the consequential benefits that 
accrue from free speech, the argument from self-fulfilment relates to the “intrinsic 
importance of speech to each individual.”183 As Barendt accurately describes, “a right 
to express beliefs… reflects what it is to be human.”184 Free speech is an essential part 
of an individual’s self-fulfilment and without the ability to speak and write freely, that 
individual’s life is poorer and their self-development lessened. Extrajudicial free speech 
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can be justified on this basis. Writing judgments affords judges only limited scope for 
expressing their opinions and beliefs. In a judgment, a judge expresses his opinion as 
to the legal issues directly relevant to the resolution of the case, or if making an obiter 
statement, a legal issue that is tangentially linked. It is only in the realm of extrajudicial 
speech that a judge has a free reign to write on what he wants to. This work is 
undoubtedly intellectually satisfying for the judge and contributes to his personal 
growth. Judges have noted this exact benefit of extrajudicial speech. For example, 
Ripple185 noted extrajudicial writing provided the opportunity for “intellectual 
enrichment” and “put the jurist in touch with a broader world of ideas”.186 
 
In a practical sense too, allowing judges the ability to express themselves extrajudicially 
provides benefits. Noonan187 argued that the “most benefited person” is the judge, who 
“attain[s] greater clarity of thought through the discipline of writing”, “acquir[es] 
mastery over one subject” and “develops a fluency of style and ease of expression” 
through extrajudicial writing.188 While this may be overstating the position somewhat, 
in that judges are no doubt already skilled writers, Noonan is correct to identify judges 
themselves benefit from academic writing. Further, extrajudicial writing contributes to 
increasing the skills and capabilities of the judiciary as a whole.189 These practical 
benefits accrue to society. Indeed, there is a public interest in having a highly skilled 
judiciary as collectively, they will render better judgments. This and the other practical 
benefits of judicial free speech and the importance of protecting it as a principle must 
be taken into account in deciding how it should be regulated. 
B Functioning of the Legal System 
 
The other main consideration in deciding how extrajudicial speech should be regulated 
is the administration of justice. There are a number of sub issues that fall under this 
head. 
1 Maintaining judicial impartiality 
 
Most importantly, it is essential that judicial impartiality is maintained.190 To reiterate, 
an impartial judiciary is necessary to maintain public confidence in the judiciary and in 
turn, ensure the public accepts the legitimacy of the judges. Extrajudicial writing may 
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undermine judicial impartiality. To the extent that such writing suggests the judge is 
actually biased or, gives rise to an apprehension of bias, the judge’s impartiality is 
called in to question. If these sorts of occurrences were widespread, public confidence 
in the judiciary would decline.191 This weighs against judicial free speech and could 
justify the imposition of a limit on free speech, in order to protect judicial impartiality. 
That being said, a limit may be unnecessary. Judicial impartiality may be sufficiently 
protected as long as a judge is willing to recuse himself where his impartiality is 
questioned and the Saxmere test satisfied. Insofar as this becomes established as the 
norm of judicial practice, a positive limitation on free speech may not be required.  
2 Problems caused by a policy of recusal 
 
However, there is potential for the policy of recusal to impact on the efficient and 
effective functioning of the legal system. Although it is important to err on the side of 
caution with regards to requests to recuse, judges should not recuse too easily. Once a 
judge has recused themselves on the basis of an apprehension of bias arising from 
extrajudicial writing, he will have to do so whenever that issue arises. If the issue is a 
narrow factual or legal one, it may not pose a problem for the administration of justice, 
but where the issue is wider, recusal would be frequently necessitated. For example, 
following Hoekstra, Lord McCluskey would be precluded from hearing any case that 
in any relevant way relied on the European Convention.192 This would be equivalent to 
a New Zealand judge expressing his extreme dislike for NZBORA and then being 
forced to recuse himself, repeatedly, from any case invoking NZBORA rights. Thus, 
where the issue giving rise to alleged bias is not discrete, but one that could be 
connected to any number of future cases, judges may need to recuse repeatedly.  
 
Frequent recusals may cause two further subsidiary issues to arise. First, judges are 
most likely to write and speak extrajudicially in their area of legal expertise meaning 
their recusal will be necessitated in this area. This may be harmful to the effective 
functioning of the judicial system as judges who are best placed to hear cases due to 
their expertise may be precluded from hearing them. For example, Judge Harvey, an 
intellectual property law expert, was precluded from hearing Kim Dotcom’s extradition 
case, which invoked copyright issues. However, as New Zealand does not have an overt 
policy of judicial specialisation,193 this would be coincidental, rather than a frequent 
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problem. The better example is with judges who sit on specialist courts and write 
extrajudicially within that area of specialty. The large number of writings by Family 
Court judges, on specific issues in family law, may be seen as more concerning in this 
regard.194 Second, a policy of recusal is especially problematic where the judge sits on 
an appellate bench, and his recusal leaves the court a judge short. The Supreme Court 
Act requires an acting judge be appointed in this event, so that a full bench of five is 
constituted.195 However, even this is an additional burden on the legal system. The fact 
Supreme Court judges account for a sizeable portion of articles published by judges in 
New Zealand increases the chances of this occurring.196 
3 False bias claims 
 
The final consideration stems from the not uncommon practice of unsuccessful litigants 
bringing empty bias claims in the hope of having a previous judgment overturned. As 
noted in Part II, Elias CJ has remarked that in New Zealand there is “no shortage” of 
litigants bringing these sorts of bias claims.197 This is an already troubling process, 
which unnecessarily occupies judicial time and resources. As such, it is essential the 
approach to regulating extrajudicial speech does not encourage this behaviour to 
continue. If the standard for a finding of apparent bias based on extrajudicial speech is 
too low, there is the risk it may be used as a vehicle for empty bias claims. This would 
frustrate judicial resources and reduce the efficiency of the legal system. As such, the 
threshold must be sufficiently high to ensure this behaviour does not occur.  
C Does Current Regulation Strike the Right Balance? 
 
The current regulation of extrajudicial speech adequately accommodates the competing 
considerations outlined above. The status quo recognises the right to judicial free 
speech by imposing no sweeping restrictions on what a judge can say extrajudicially. 
This acknowledges that judges can express their opinions to the law beyond the 
parameters of a judgement. At the same time, judicial impartiality and public 
confidence are protected by allowing such commentary to be the basis of actual or 
apparent bias and requiring recusal where the Saxmere test is satisfied. This approach 
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does rely on a judge doing the right thing and being willing to recuse himself where his 
impartiality is questioned. Hypothetically, it is possible a judge might refuse to recuse 
himself, as Justice Scalia did in Hamdan.198 However, there is no reason to think this 
would be the norm; in New Zealand, Judge Harvey immediately recused himself once 
the media publicised his comment. In any case, if a judge refused to recuse himself 
where he ought to have, any concern is ameliorated by the fact a litigant could bring a 
cause of action alleging bias. 
 
Further, the threshold for apparent bias and recusal is pitched at a sufficiently high level. 
Case law and judicial conduct codes mandate there must be something unique about 
extrajudicial writing or speech before the Saxmere test is satisfied; its mere presence is 
not enough. The requirement that the tone and language employed must be intemperate 
before the test is satisfied protects the efficient and effective functioning of the judicial 
system. Since the Saxmere test will rarely be met, the legal system will not be impacted 
by frequent recusals and the concomitant problems this causes. This threshold also 
dissuades empty bias claims, as litigants will have to do far more than merely identify 
an instance of extrajudicial writing or speaking on a relevant issue before the bias claim 
is successful.  
 
Although it is accepted the status quo balances the competing interests correctly, it is 
not without its flaws. In particular, the current guidelines are difficult to apply in 
practice. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely what language and tone will be deemed 
trenchant and what is the permissible expression of an opinion. It is a fine line and 
judges are likely to differ in their application of this standard. Lippman notes this “is 
not an exercise amendable to bright-line rules” as each case depends on its facts.199 
Lord Bingham argues that in the area of professional conduct and responsibility, such 
as judicial bias, there is a need for “a clearly defined rule which… judges can readily 
absorb and apply”.200 It is doubtful whether the law as it stands achieves this: while the 
rule is consistently stated, it is difficult to apply. 
 
Despite the deficiencies of the current regulation, it is unclear whether the creation of 
further more specific rules would help this situation. Perhaps more guidance needs to 
be provided as to what constitutes a “trenchant” or “intemperate” tone? However, this 
may be undesirable and only have a chilling effect on legitimate extrajudicial speech.201 
One approach could be to include examples of impermissible speech, such as Hoekstra 
or Timmins, so that judges have a standard to measure their speech against. It may be 
                                               
198 See Part III. 
199 Lippman, above n 149, at 1385–1386. 
200 Lord Bingham “What is the law?” (2009) 40 VUWLR 597 at 610. 
201 Ross, above n 149, at 641 
36 
 
that the time, manner and place suggestions noted by academics should be incorporated 
into the Guidelines as a practical reference point for judges. But, these are common 
sense recommendations and may not be especially useful in helping judges determine 
if their writing or speech has crossed some poorly defined line.  
 
Most academics acknowledge this problem with definition but accept that the status 
quo is satisfactory. However, some commentators have taken a vastly different 
approach, as discussed in the following Part. 
 
VI Reform: The Sound Of Silence? 
 
This Part will consider whether a policy of judicial silence should be adopted in 
response to the problems posed by extrajudicial commentary. This is the suggestion put 
forward by Australian academics Bartie and Gava. Their argument will be broken down 
and discussed and then a critique will be provided. 
A Bartie and Gava’s Argument for Judicial Silence 
1 The problem with extrajudicial writing 
 
Bartie and Gava write from the assumption that common law judging is creative and 
that in espousing the law, a judge is stating what he thinks the law should be.202 In this 
context, once a judge has expressed his view on the law extrajudicially, he has 
prejudged a legal issue, which he may be later required to decide. 203 In other words, 
the Saxmere apparent bias test is satisfied. This problem arises in regards to all 
academic writing on live legal issues, which are controversial issues the courts may 
adjudicate on in the future.204 This narrows the scope of extrajudicial writing considered 
in this paper, to a subset of academic writing. 
 
Certain characteristics of academic writing contribute to the alleged bias problem. First, 
the method of academic writing mirrors judgment writing, as a judge will survey the 
common law authorities on a legal point, then decide how the issue should be resolved, 
much as he would in a judgment.205 Second, the writing is a “crystallisation of the 
judge’s opinion in print”.206 Rather than being tentative, it is the result of ample time 
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and intellectual effort, meaning a judge is committed to the position he arrives at.  207 
Third, since the work is publicly available to practitioners and other academics, a judge 
has an increased “investment” in it and will try hard to perfect it.208 
 
Following from this, Bartie and Gava disagree with the premise underpinning the 
current regulation of extrajudicial speech, that the tone and expression of the writing is 
significant. Part IV discussed this approach, which affirms that a judge’s written 
expression needs to be intemperate before any issue of prejudgment arises. Bartie and 
Gava reject this approach as being unconvincing and contend that dispassionate legal 
writing is equally likely to lead to prejudgment.209 The corollary of this is that any 
extrajudicial writing on a live legal issue would satisfy the apparent bias test and require 
a judge to recuse himself from hearing the case. This has wide ranging implications 
given the proclivity of judges to write extrajudicially. 
2 Examples 
 
Bartie and Gava provide two Australian examples illustrating the concerns identified in 
extrajudicial writing. The first is an article on malicious prosecution, published by 
Justice Ipp in the Australian Law Journal.210 In the article, Ipp surveys the common law 
on, and policy arguments pertaining to, malicious prosecution and concludes that his 
judicial colleague incorrectly decided a recent case. The article mirrors the approach a 
judge would take if confronted with the issue in a case, presenting the risk that if that 
occurred, Ipp would merely replicate his article, rather than resolving the case on its 
merits.211 The second example relates to judges who serve as textbook editors. In two 
particular appeal decisions,212 the judges sitting have criticised the trial judges’ 
decisions extrajudicially in a textbook and decided the appeals in line with that 
criticism.213 Bartie and Gava are concerned by this practice and believe it is a clear 
example of prejudgment. 214 
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3 Counter arguments 
 
Having established their thesis, Bartie and Gava consider the arguments against their 
position. The main defence of academic writing is that a judge can distance himself 
from his extrajudicial work and will not blindly apply his expressed opinion should the 
same issue arise in a case. Bartie and Gava concede a judge may be capable of doing 
this on occasion, however they believe it is naïve to assume judges will do so 
regularly.215 Rather, there is an ever pervasive risk a judge will follow what he has 
written extrajudicially because “that is the way human nature works.”216 A similar 
argument is made by Bickel, who thought extrajudicial writing could lead to 
prejudgment because “nothing is more persuasive to us than our own published 
prose.”217 
 
Bartie and Gava are also careful to distinguish extrajudicial writing from a judge’s work 
prior to appointment and their written judgements. This distinction is a necessary one. 
The logical extension of Bartie and Gava’s argument is that a judge’s publications while 
an academic, and his advocacy work while a barrister, would lead to prejudgement. 
This would mean a judge would have prejudged all live legal issues he encountered in 
working life. If this was true, Bartie and Gava’s argument is nonsensical. However, this 
outcome is precluded by the judicial appointment process. The “private decision to 
become a judge” and “public affirmation to judge according to the law and merits of 
the case”, through taking an oath, are argued by Bartie and Gava to cleanse a judge of 
his ties to legal positions held before appointment.218 Judgments are also different to 
academic writing. Context is important here: judgments require a judge, as a part of 
their job, to form opinions on the law, in regard to a distinct set of facts, having had the 
benefit of hearing arguments on the law by counsel. By contrast, academic writing is 
purely voluntary, written by a judge to give “effect to purely personal preferences”, 
absent of facts and legal argument.219  
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4 The solution 
 
The solution to this bias problem is described as “simple”: “busy judges should not 
write about moot legal problems”.220 Rather than any law change, Bartie and Gava 
envisage a self-imposed ban – a form of judicial self-censorship, characterised as one 
of the many duties incumbent on judges upon their ascension to the bench.221 Judicial 
recusal is seen as an inadequate solution. The scope of the problem, as characterised by 
Bartie and Gava, is so wide that the legal system would be unable to sustain the 
widespread recusal that would occur.222 
B Critique 
1 Prejudgment 
 
This paper argues that Bartie and Gava’s hypothesis is principally and practically 
wrong. The first premise requiring further analysis is whether the problem of 
prejudgment applies in respect of all extrajudicial writing on live legal issues. Bartie 
and Gava contend that it does. A different approach, focusing on the tone and 
expression of writing, is ascertainable in judicial conduct codes and case law.223 A 
different approach again is put forward by Finn, writing specifically in response to 
Bartie and Gava. Finn distinguishes between the making of factual findings and 
determinations of what the law is and argues it is only extrajudicial statements on the 
facts that raise the possibility of bias.224 For example, where a judge has, in extrajudicial 
writing, expressed doubts as to the credibility of a certain class of witness, this may 
raise an apprehension of bias.225 Comparatively, merely taking a stance on a legal issue 
will not give rise to such an apprehension.   
 
Finn states the proposition too strongly. It is clear apparent bias can arise from 
statements concerning the law. This is demonstrated by Hoekstra, where Lord 
McCluskey’s extrajudicial statements on the merits of the Convention were held to give 
rise to the appearance of bias. Cases such as Locabail indicate that when a judge writes 
extrajudicially he must be “circumspect in the language he uses and the tone in which 
he expresses himself” lest a finding of apparent bias be made.226 Such statements are 
                                               
220 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 657. 
221 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 657. 
222 Bartie and Gava, above n 111, at 657. 
223 See Part IV. 
224 Chris Finn “Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava” (2014) 34 
Adel L Rev 267 at 268–269. 
225 Finn, above n 224, at 270. 
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general; not particularised and narrowed towards statements as to the facts and certainly 
broad enough to encompass statements concerning the law. The majority of academic 
opinion is also in favour of this position. Hammond, for example, in his text on judicial 
recusal, suggests extrajudicial writing on a question of law or criticism of the 
approaches taken by other judges, could result in apparent bias.227 
 
However, it is incorrect to assert all academic writing automatically results in 
prejudgment. The correct position falls between the two extremes: extrajudicial writing 
on a legal matter can, but will not necessarily, lead to apparent bias. This conclusion is 
reached through consideration of the Saxmere test and the characteristics of a fair-
minded lay observer.228 In short, the fair-minded lay observer is not unduly suspicious, 
is informed of the workings of the legal system and is taken to know that a judge has 
sworn a judicial oath to decide cases impartially.229 Bearing this in mind, it is unlikely 
a fair-minded lay observer would assume a judge was unable to decide a case 
impartially because of the mere existence of extrajudicial writing on a relevant legal 
matter. A fair-minded lay observer knows of the tradition of judicial impartiality and 
that the very nature of a judge’s job requires him to put aside his views, whether 
expressed or unexpressed, when hearing a case. Knowing this background information, 
a fair-minded lay observer would have to be unduly suspicious before he would 
entertain the idea a judge may be biased by a single piece of academic writing.  
 
Plainly, something more than the existence of extrajudicial writing is needed before 
bias is apprehended. That ‘something more’ derives from the tone of the writing and 
the language the judge uses. If the foregoing is extreme and unbalanced, a fair-minded 
lay observer is more likely to assume the judge is inflexible, dedicated to the expressed 
opinion and less able to bring an open mind. Thus, contrary to what Bartie and Gava 
suggest, the tone of the extrajudicial writing is crucial to a finding of prejudgment. As 
such, the examples Bartie and Gava refer to are only concerning insofar as judicial 
authors adopted this kind of tone. This also dispenses with the need to distinguish legal 
positions articulated by the judge prior to appointment on the arbitrary basis of taking 
a judicial oath.  
2 Academic writing 
 
Bartie and Gava’s observations on academic writing are also open to criticism. 
Academic writing, rather than being a crystallisation of the judge’s opinion, may well 
be tentative. Because it is written in the abstract, in a situation devoid of facts and 
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arguments of counsel, judges may simply be hypothesising or testing a legal argument 
to see its academic reception. There is always the possibility a judge will decide a case 
differently because of the factual matrix, counsel’s arguments or indeed the arguments 
his colleagues make. Glazebrook J, writing extrajudicially in a paper on tax avoidance, 
noted there was no “guarantee” the interpretation of tax avoidance cases she put forward 
“would survive argument in court and collegial discussion of those arguments” in a 
later case or that it would be endorsed by the Supreme Court.230 Some may argue this 
disclaimer is only empty words, however, the better argument is that a judge’s 
extrajudicial writing is not their final opinion on an issue. 
 
Further, Bartie and Gava’s suggestion a judge is invested in his extrajudicial work and 
wants the legal profession to remain confident in it is also a tenuous argument. Judges 
in the lower echelons of the court structure, and indeed all judges at some stage in their 
judicial career, have had their judgements criticised and overturned on appeal or 
scrutinised by academics. Judges are more thick-skinned than Bartie and Gava give 
them credit for and suggesting judges are so sensitive to criticism is not suited to the 
realities of their profession.  
3 Solution 
 
Bartie and Gava’s solution of judicial silence is predicated on the fact that every 
instance of extrajudicial writing on a live legal issue results in prejudgment. Once it is 
accepted that this is not the case, judicial silence is a complete overreaction. The need 
to recuse would only seldom arise, when the tone and language used in an article were 
intemperate. The rarity of the problem is further emphasised by the empirical research 
conducted, which highlights the low level of extrajudicial writing by judges in New 
Zealand law journals.231 To silence judges in this context is wholly unnecessary and 
defies common sense. Instead, the status quo approach of recusal is entirely appropriate. 
Given that recusals would be infrequent, this would not put an undue strain on the 
judiciary as Bartie and Gava suggest. 
  
                                               
230 Susan Glazebrook “Statutory Interpretation, tax avoidance and the Supreme Court: Reconciling the 
specific and the general” (paper presented at the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 2013 
Tax Conference, Auckland, November 2013) at 2. Heath J also takes a similar approach in Paul Heath 
“Some thoughts on a (New Zealand) judicial approach to trust law” (paper presented at the Society of 
Trust and Estate Practitioners New Zealand Conference, Auckland, 29 March 2012) at [1]. See also Ross, 
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C Other Objections to Judicial Silence 
 
In addition to the doctrinal problems identified, there are sound policy reasons why 
judicial silence could not be adopted. First, Bartie and Gava’s proposal can be seen as 
an unjustified incursion on judicial free speech. The restriction is clearly aimed at 
preserving judicial impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary. However, it is 
not a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society;232 it is far too wide. To effectively muzzle judges and prevent them from 
writing or speaking extrajudicially on any live legal issue, for example, by amending 
the Judges’ Bench Book to that effect, is to significantly deprive the judiciary of their 
right to free expression. This would be tantamount to a return to the anachronistic 
Kilmuir Rules that governed extrajudicial speech from 1950–1970. The Rules 
originated with a statement by Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, 
that:233 
 
So long as the Judge keeps silent, his reputation for wisdom and impartiality 
remains unassailable… every utterance which he makes in public… must 
necessarily bring him within the focus of criticism.  
 
The modern approach to judicial free speech has vastly progressed from the Kilmuir 
Rules and Bartie and Gava fail to demonstrate any cogent reasons to justify a reversion 
to the Rules.  
 
From a practical perspective, a policy of judicial silence is also unattractive. Judges 
need an outlet to express their opinions as to the law, which extrajudicial writing 
provides. If this outlet is taken away, it is possible judgments will take its place and will 
be stacked with superfluous comments that judges are otherwise unable to express. The 
increased amounts of obiter dicta in judgments, only vaguely related to the legal issues 
in a case, will reduce the clarity and precision of the law. Further, the public will be 
deprived of the valuable educative resource extrajudicial writing provides. A judge’s 
extrajudicial writing on unresolved legal issues is of huge value to the legal profession, 
especially given the small size of the profession in this country.234  
 
That being said, the author accepts the practice of self-censorship, which some judges 
choose to adopt. Felix Frankfurter described his time spent serving on the United States 
                                               
232 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. See Part V. 
233 Letter from Lord Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor of Great Britain) to Sir Ian Jacob K.B.E. (Director General 
of the BBC) (12 December 1995), as cited in Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls “Where 
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Supreme Court as one where he was plagued by “judicial lockjaw”, a form of judicial 
restraint that stopped him from participating in extrajudicial activities.235 In the same 
way, Mason reminds us that some judges “maintain that their job is to speak only 
through their judgments”, as is their right to do.236 It is entirely acceptable if a judge 
chooses, for his own reasons, not to participate in extrajudicial activity. However, it 
would be wrong to mandate this practice in the Judges’ Bench Book or Guidelines. 
 
VII  Why Does This Even Matter?: A Legal Realist Critique 
 
A legal realist would object to the main contention of this paper, that extrajudicial 
writing can raise issues of bias. As a critique, this Part considers the objections a legal 
realist might raise.  
A The Legal Realist Argument  
 
According to legal realist theory, common law judging is not a mechanistic process of 
merely applying precedent, but is somewhat creative. Interpreting the law and applying 
it to the facts is not a clear cut exercise and vests a judge with discretion. That discretion 
is exercised in a way that reflects a judge’s opinion as to what the law should be and 
his broader worldview. As such, the decision rendered depends very much on the 
identity of the individual judge. Two judges adjudicating identical cases may come to 
opposing conclusions as their subjectively held beliefs come to bear on the decision.237 
That is to say, judges are “influenced by their political and moral views and by their 
personal biases” in rendering decisions.238  
 
According to legal realists, judges bring with them to the bench their own worldview. 
For example, Cardozo opined in his seminal work, The Nature of Judicial Process, 
that:239 
 
There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it 
philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. 
Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, 
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forces which they do not recognise and cannot name, have been tugging at them – 
inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is an 
outlook on life, a conception of social needs. 
 
Cardozo went on to remark that judges “do not stand aloof on… chill and distant 
heights”; “the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in 
their course and pass the judges by.”240 Judges, like all others, are affected by “likes 
and dislikes… predilections and…prejudices… instincts and emotions and habits and 
convictions”.241 
 
More narrowly, and most pertinent to this paper, judges undoubtedly have their own 
opinions on the law. This colours what judicial impartiality means. Judge Jerome Frank 
noted in Re JP Linahan Inc that if impartiality meant “the total absence of 
preconceptions in the mind of a judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one 
ever will”.242 In Laird v Tatum, Rehnquist J similarly stated that if a judge’s mind was 
“a complete tabula rasa243 in the area of constitutional adjudication” when he became a 
judge, that would demonstrate he was not qualified, rather than not biased.244 Even Elias 
CJ acknowledges that “good judges will not be ideological virgins when appointed”.245 
In this context, impartiality does not mean having no opinions as to the law; it is 
inevitable that all judges do. 
 
These opinions and a judge’s broader worldview influence how judicial decisions are 
resolved. Tamanaha remarks that “how judges interpret the rules will be a function of 
their personal views and the surrounding social forces.”246 Likewise, Cardozo was of 
the opinion that “when reasons are nicely balanced” a judge’s instincts, beliefs and 
convictions, “determine where choice shall fall.247 The problem of extrajudicial writing 
falls in this context. Once it is acknowledged a judge’s mind is not a blank slate and 
that the opinions he holds come to bear in his judgments, extrajudicial writing is 
perceived in a very different light. In particular, the choice is not between judges who 
have no opinions or inherent biases and judges who do and who have expressed these 
thoughts extrajudicially. All judges are equally subject to predilections, whether 
captured in writing or not. Contextualising the issue, the Recorder in Timmins, for 
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example, has a partiality towards claimants and against insurers irrespective of whether 
this has been expressed extrajudicially.  
 
Following from this, extrajudicial writing is beneficial because it exposes the opinions 
the judge holds. Transparency is enhanced when a judge acknowledges his worldview 
and approaches to judging extrajudicially. This is helpful to individual litigants 
appearing before the judge who are informed of possible adverse views the judge has.248 
This enables litigants to tailor their submissions and oral arguments to address the 
judge’s concerns. In a broader sense, Reinhart249 argues the writing serves a public 
good:250 
 
There is no good reason for judges to attempt to conceal the fact that we approach 
the law with differing judicial philosophies or the fact that those differences may 
lead to differences in our interpretations of the law. Even if this were not so 
obvious from our opinions, I believe that it would be our duty to share our 
respective visions of the law with the public. The public should know what 
approach we as individuals take from the bench; it should be aware that we are not 
carbon copies of each other; and it should be aware that some decisions are indeed 
influenced by the philosophies and values that judges bring to the bench. 
 
Further, to impugn the practice of extrajudicial writing is to put a premium on the 
appearance of impartiality, when impartiality in fact is somewhat of a myth. From this 
perspective, extrajudicial writing should be wholly allowed; it poses no problems for 
recusal and bias.  
B Conclusions on the Legal Realist Argument 
 
The author accepts that common law judging is creative and provides scope for judges 
to be flexible in the application of legal rules. In particular, judges are able to consider 
what the interests of justice demand in a particular case. Thomas argues that notions of 
justice “infect the decision-making process” and “may be decisive” when judges weigh 
competing interests.251 Likewise, it is not disputed that judges have their own personal 
opinions on matters of legal doctrine – publicly expressed or not, these opinions 
nonetheless exist.  
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The law on apparent bias and recusal as it presently stands, does not make provision for 
this. Elias CJ and Lord Neuberger MR accept the law as it is but note that its operation 
is perplexing.252 Both see a tension in requiring a judge to recuse himself because of 
extrajudicial writing, but simultaneously allowing a judge to sit where there is no 
writing, but the opinion still held. Elias CJ observed she was “not sure what signal this 
sends out.”253 Lord Neuberger went as far as to say that the status quo “seems to value 
justice being seen to be done above justice actually being done.”254 These concerns are 
valid and do expose a difficult area of the law.  
 
Perhaps the somewhat artificial focus on the appearance of impartiality can be justified 
by the value it is seeking to protect, that being public confidence in the judiciary. If 
there were doubts about a judge’s impartiality and nothing was done to alleviate this, 
public confidence in the judiciary would be undermined. This would impinge on the 
effective functioning of the judicial system to the detriment of all. For this reason, the 
focus on the appearance of impartiality is explicable, although it sits somewhat 
uncomfortably with impartiality in fact.   
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the problems extrajudicial speech may create. 
In particular, a subset of extrajudicial writing, contributions to academia, was focused 
on. This sort of writing and speaking can cause a judge’s impartiality to be questioned. 
As a consequence, the apparent bias test from Saxmere may be satisfied and the judge 
may have to recuse himself or face his decision being challenged for bias. This problem 
could arise in respect of two issues. First, a judge may be biased on a legal matter 
relevant to the case. The example here is Hoekstra, where bias arose in relation to Lord 
McCluskey’s extrajudicial statements on the European Convention. Second, a judge 
may indicate extrajudicially that he is biased towards some aspect of the facts of a case 
that later arises before him. For example, in Locabail, a personal injury case, the 
Recorder was found to be biased against the defendants (insurers) and towards the 
claimant. In New Zealand, this issue arose in the context of Kim Dotcom’s extradition 
hearing, when Judge Harvey appeared biased against the United States in the context 
of copyright law.  
 
The current approach to this problem, found in judicial conduct codes and case law, is 
that judges are free to express opinions on legal issues outside of judgments in written 
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publications and speeches. However, if the tone and language used are intemperate, the 
Saxmere test for apparent bias may be satisfied and the judge will need to recuse 
himself.  
 
The remainder of the paper analysed whether this is the correct approach. Any approach 
must navigate between two concerns: protecting judicial free speech and ensuring the 
effective and efficient functioning of the legal system. These goals are at odds with 
each other and the line must be drawn somewhere between them. The status quo 
achieves an appropriate balance, recognising free speech but also upholding the 
integrity of the justice system by protecting judicial impartiality. The threshold for 
recusal is high enough to preclude problems such as litigants bringing hollow bias 
claims. In this context, a policy of judicial silence is not only unnecessary, but also 
undesirable. It denies judges the right to express their opinions and robs society of an 
invaluable educative resource.  
 
The empirical research conducted coloured this analysis. The number of extrajudicial 
articles published in New Zealand law reviews demonstrates there is only a small scope 
for bias and recusal problems to occur. This suggests adopting a drastic approach of 
judicial silence is wholly unnecessary. Despite this, the incident with Judge Harvey 
illustrates the risk of bias and recusal always exists, even when a judge is quite 
innocuously speaking at a conference. The media backlash following this incident led 
to the impartiality of the judiciary being brought into question. This is something to be 
avoided for the reasons outlined in this paper. In order achieve this, it is important that 
judges are alert to the concerns associated with extrajudicial speech and tailor their 
writing and speaking so that bias and recusal problems are not created. 
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IX    Appendix 1: Number of Articles Published by Judges in New Zealand Law Reviews 2004–2014
 Number of Articles Published by Judges 
Journal 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 Total 
Auckland University Law 
Review 
- 0 1 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Canterbury Law Review - - 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 
Maori Law Review 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
New Zealand Intellectual 
Property Law Journal 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand Journal of 
Environment Law 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand Journal of 
Family Law 
0 1 3 2 2 5 1 5 3 4 3 29 
New Zealand Journal of 
Public and International 
Law 
- 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 
New Zealand Law Review 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 
New Zealand Universities 
Law Review 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 - - 2 
Otago Law Review - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Victoria University Law 
Review 
0 0 1 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 8 
Waikato Law Review 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 10 
Total 4 2 6 8 6 10 6 8 5 8 7 70 
A ‘-’ has been used where the volume was unavailable.  
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X Appendix 2: Number of Articles Published by Judges 2004–2014, by 
Court 
A Table 2.1: Judicial Publication, According to Court 
Judge Court* Number of Articles 
Sian Elias Supreme Court 12 
Peter Blanchard Supreme Court 3 
William Young Supreme Court 1 
Grant Hammond Court of Appeal 2 
Susan Glazebrook Court of Appeal 4 
Noel Anderson Court of Appeal 1 
Robert Chambers Court of Appeal 1 
David Baragwanath Court of Appeal 1 
Stephen Kós High Court 1 
Graham Pankhurst High Court 1 
John Priestly High Court 1 
Paul Heath High Court 2 
Eddie Durie High Court 1 
John Hansen High Court 1 
Joseph Williams High Court 1 
David Harvey District Court 1 
Anna-Marie Skellern District Court 1 
Peter Spiller District Court 1 
AP Walsh District Court 1 
Jan Doogue District Court and Family Court 3 
Peter Boshier Family Court 20 
Paul von Dadelszen Family Court 3 
Dale Clarkson Family Court 2 
Ian Mill Family Court 1 
Annis E Somerville Family Court 1 
Craig Coxhead Maori Land Court 2 
Andrew Becroft Youth Court 1 
*As determined at the date the article was published. 
B Table 2.2: Summary of Judicial Publication, According to Court 
Court Number of Publications Percentage of Total 
Publications 
Supreme Court 16 23% 
Court of Appeal 9 13% 
High Court 8 12% 
District Court 5 7% 
Family Court 29 41% 
Maori Land Court 2 3% 
Youth Court 1 1% 
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C Table 2.3: Summary of Judicial Publication of the Non-Specialist Courts 
 
 
  
Court Number of Publications Percentage of Total 
Publications 
Supreme Court 16 42% 
Court of Appeal 9 24% 
High Court 8 21% 
District Court 5 13% 
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XI   Appendix 3: Number of Articles Published by Judges 2004–2014, by 
Frequency 
Judge Court Number of Articles 
 
Peter Boshier Family Court 20 
Sian Elias Supreme Court 12 
Susan Glazebrook Court of Appeal 4 
Peter Blanchard Supreme Court 3 
Jan Doogue District Court and Family Court 3 
Paul von Dadelszen Family Court 3 
Grant Hammond Court of Appeal  2 
Paul Heath High Court  2 
Dale Clarkson Family Court 2 
Craig Coxhead Maori Land Court 2 
William Young Supreme Court 1 
Noel Anderson Court of Appeal 1 
Robert Chambers Court of Appeal 1 
David Baragwanath Court of Appeal 1 
Stephen Kós High Court 1 
Graham Pankhurst High Court 1 
John Priestly High Court 1 
Eddie Durie High Court 1 
John Hansen High Court 1 
Joseph Williams High Court 1 
David Harvey District Court 1 
Anna-Marie Skellern District Court 1 
Peter Spiller District Court 1 
AP Walsh District Court 1 
Ian Mill Family Court 1 
Annis E Somerville Family Court 1 
Andrew Becroft Youth Court 1 
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XII   Appendix 4: Number of Articles Published by Judges 2004–2014, by 
Category  
Category Number of 
Publications 
Percentage of Total 
Publications 
Specific Legal Topics 25 36% 
Procedural Topics 18 26% 
Historical or Biographical Topics 5 7% 
Other Topics 22 31% 
A List of Articles According to Category 
1 Specific legal topics 
 
David Baragwanath “The Evolution of Treaty Jurisprudence” (2007) 15 Wai L Rev 1. 
 
Peter Blanchard “Approaches of Business Rehabilitation” (2005) 13 Wai L Rev 46. 
 
Peter Blanchard “The Early Experience of the New Zealand Supreme Court (2008) 6 
NZJPIL 175. 
 
Peter Blanchard “The New Zealand Bill of Rights: Where Have We Got To After 16 
Years?” [2008] NZ L Rev 263. 
 
Peter Boshier “Care and protection of children: New Zealand and Australian experience 
of cross-border cooperation” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 63. 
 
Peter Boshier “Dealing with family violence in New Zealand” (2007) 5 NZFLJ 241. 
 
Peter Boshier “Have judges been missing the point and allowing relocation too 
readily?” (2010) 6 NZFLJ 334. 
 
Peter Boshier “Investing in life: Meeting the cost of family violence” (2012) 7 NZFLJ 
135. 
 
Peter Boshier “Relocation cases: an international view from the bench” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 
77. 
 
Peter Boshier “The strengths and weaknesses of the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction – a New Zealand 
perspective” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 250. 
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Peter Boshier and Jennifer Wademan “Early mental health intervention with young 
people – is the Mental Health Act a help or a hindrance?” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 210. 
 
Peter Boshier and Jennifer Wademan and Thomas Dewar “Domestic Violence and the 
Impact on Children’s Lives” (2013) 7 NZFLJ 264. 
 
Robert Chambers “Trial Rights for the Mentally Impaired” (2011) 24 NZULR 478. 
 
Dale Clarkson “Contempt – Does the Family Court finally have teeth?” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 
187. 
 
Dale Clarkson and Hugh Clarkson “The rights of children under the Care of Children 
Act 2004, with particular reference to cases of parental alienation or intractable contact 
disputes” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 91. 
 
Craig Coxhead “Maori land, unlocking the potential” (2013) Maori LR.  
 
Jan Doogue “Sections 15 and 15A of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 – six years 
on: certainty or uncertainty?” (2007) 5 NZFLJ 282. 
 
Jan Doogue “The Domestic Violence Act 1995 and s 16B of the Guardianship Act 1968 
– the effect on children’s relationships with their non-custodial parent” (2004) 4 FLJ 
243. 
 
Susan Glazebrook “Human Rights and the Environment” (2009) 40 VUWLR 293. 
 
Paul Heath “Bringing Trading Trusts into the Company Line” [2010] NZ L Rev 519. 
 
Stephen Kós “Constraints on the Exercise of Contractual Power” (2011) 42 VUWLR 
17. 
 
Anna-Marie Skellern “The Climate Change Response Act 2002: The Origin and 
Evolution of s 3A – The Treaty Clause” (2012) 10 NZJPIL 167. 
 
Annis E Somerville “Whanaugatanga in the Family Court” (2006) 5 NZFLJ 140.  
 
Paul von Dadelszen “The Adoption Act 1955 – the pressing need for reform” (2009) 6 
NZFLJ 117. 
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AP Walsh “Youth justice model v the welfare model: have we got the balance right?” 
(2007) 5 NZFLJ 249. 
2 Procedural topics 
 
Noel Anderson “The Appearance of Justice” (2004) 12 Wai L Rev 1. 
 
Andrew Becroft “Access to Youth Justice in New Zealand: ‘The Very Good, the Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly’” (2011) 18 Auckland U L Rev 23. 
 
Peter Boshier “Challenges Facing the Family Court” (2008) 6 NZJPIL 1. 
 
Peter Boshier “Developing Family Relationships” (2010) 16 Canta LR 127. 
 
Peter Boshier “Dispute Resolution in the Family Court” (2007) 5 NZFLJ 295. 
 
Peter Boshier “Government review of the Family Court – some room for change” 
(2011) 7 NZFLJ 53. 
 
Peter Boshier “Out of the Darkness: Arresting the spiral of family violence” (2010) 6 
NZFLJ 266. 
 
Peter Boshier. “The Domestic Violence Act ten years on” (2006) 5 NZFLJ 133. 
 
Peter Boshier “The Family Court and the future” (2004) 11. 
 
Peter Boshier “Transforming dispute resolution in the Family Court” (2005) 5 NZFLJ 
53. 
 
Peter Boshier and Jennifer Wademan “Are stopping violence programmes worthwhile” 
(2009) 6 NZFLJ 119. 
 
Jan Doogue “A seismic shift or minor realignment? A view from the bench ascertaining 
children’s views” (2006) 5 NZFLJ 198.  
 
Grant Hammond “Sentencing: Intuitive Synthesis or Structured Discretion?” [2007] 
NZ L Rev 211. 
 
David Harvey “The Googling Juror: The Fate of the Jury Trial in the Digital Paradigm” 
[2014] NZ L Rev 203. 
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Ian Mill “Conversations with children: a Judge’s perspective on meeting the patient 
before operating on the family” (2009) 6 NZFLJ 72. 
 
Graham Panckhurst “A Sentencing Council: Enlightened or Folly” (2008) 14 Canta LR 
191. 
 
Paul von Dadelszen “Judicial Reforms in the Family Court of New Zealand” (2007) 5 
NZFLJ 267. 
 
William Young “The Role of Courts in Correcting Miscarriages of Justice” (2010) 16 
Canta LR 256. 
3 Historical or biographical topics 
 
Sian Elias “Eulogy for the Lord Cooke of Thorndon” (2008) 39 VUWLR 1. 
 
Sian Elias “In Memoriam: Lord Cooke of Thorndon” (2006) 22 NZULR 181. 
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